Mali’s government has detained dozens of soldiers, mostly from the National Guard, over an alleged plot to destabilise the regime. Reports vary, but between 30 and 55 arrests have been made, including two prominent generals, Abass Dembélé and Néma Sagara. The lack of a clear explanation from Bamako suggests a regime that is not demonstrating strength, but rather acting out of fear and perceiving threats from within.

From Counter-coup to Counter-productive

While every junta asserts its mandate is to establish order, Mali’s military government has, conversely, institutionalised unpredictability. In May, political parties were dissolved and gatherings prohibited. By July, a compliant process granted Colonel Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year presidential term, effectively extending military rule indefinitely and extinguishing any hope of a brief transition. Within a matter of weeks, the regime criminalised diversity and sanctioned its own perpetual authority. This is not governance; it is the administrative formalisation of apprehension.

The recent arrests highlight a deeper issue: the government’s primary mode of governance is pre-emption. This preventive political approach extends to purges, which ultimately undermine cohesion. In times of war, militaries require clear command and trust among their ranks. However, purges foster the opposite: hesitation, factionalism, and officers prioritising loyalty checks over battlefield adaptation. The evidence is clear: violence has persisted since the 2020–2021 coups. JNIM and Islamic State affiliates have expanded their operations, and high-casualty attacks, such as the recent assault waves in central and southern sectors, indicate an enemy that is evolving faster than the state.

The Russian Bet—and Its Bill

Mali’s shift from France to Moscow, presented as a sovereign reset, has proven to be a mere change of suppliers rather than a genuine solution. Russian “instructors,” initially under the Wagner label and now under rebranded structures, arrived with promises of robust counterinsurgency. This has led to documented atrocities and questionable “victories,” such as Moura in 2022 and Konokassi in 2024. A pattern of abuses has emerged, inadvertently fueling recruitment for the very jihadists Bamako aims to defeat. When the state resorts to bombing weddings or collaborating with units accused of massacres, it prioritises short-term spectacle over long-term strategic gain.

In response to regional challenges, the junta has formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and a 5,000-strong joint force with Burkina Faso and Niger, now bolstered by Russia’s promised support. However, new battalions cannot compensate for fragile institutions, suppressed political discourse, and human rights abuses by security forces. Insurgencies thrive on broken social contracts rather than weak defenses. If the regime continues to criminalise domestic dissent while relying on external deterrence, this “joint force” could become a shared burden.

Repression as Governance

Mali’s recent actions, including a May decree that dissolved political parties and silenced the media, are not emergency responses but rather a fundamental dismantling of constitutional rights. UN experts have condemned this as a direct violation of basic human rights. Reports from 2022–2024 by the United Nations, the U.S. State Department, and leading NGOs consistently document extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and a severe restriction of civic freedoms.

These latest arrests are not isolated security incidents but a continuation of this oppressive environment. When a state outlaws opposition and centralises power around a single authority, it inadvertently fosters conspiracies by eliminating all legitimate avenues for political discourse. Consequently, conspiracy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, with each arrest serving to justify the next.

In West Africa, other nations grappling with security challenges have adopted a more inclusive, albeit difficult, approach, where electoral processes, despite their flaws, hold leaders accountable and bring necessary compromises to light. Mali, however, has taken a drastically different path: disbanding political parties, postponing elections, and declaring an indefinite transitional period. The consequences are evident in the escalating casualty and displacement figures across the Sahel, which have risen despite a militarised government. The junta’s strategy involves securitising politics and politicising security, ultimately undermining its control over both.

Written By:

Dr Iqbal Survé

Past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN

*Sesona Mdlokovana

Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group

African Specialist

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