Once again, Kamal Idris, the army-appointed Prime Minister of Sudan, seeks to bypass escalating political divisions over cabinet appointments by unilaterally naming three new ministers – for Health, Higher Education, and Agriculture – joining the already appointed Ministers of Defence and Interior.

The current controversy revolves around the selection of 22 ministers whom Idris insists are technocrats. However, the Joint Forces – armed movements allied with the Sudanese army – view the appointments as an encroachment on the ministerial quota allocated to them under the Juba Peace Agreement.

Late last Thursday night, Idris announced the appointment of al-Moiz Omar Bakhit as Minister of Health, Ismat Qureshi as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, and Ahmed Madawi as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The announcement has only reignited tensions that never truly subsided.

Public Disputes

Recent reports indicate heightened verbal spats among the signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement regarding power-sharing ratios. Mohamed Bashir Abu Nama, chief negotiator of the Sudan Liberation Movement, asserted that factions incorporated into the peace agreement at a later stage are not entitled to a share of the 25% power allocation stipulated in the agreement. That quota, he insisted, is reserved solely for armed movements that originally signed the accord, not for groups from other tracks such as the North and Central regions, which were assigned separate shares in state-level governance.

In a Facebook post quoted by Sudan Tribune, Abu Namu clarified that three groups – Mustafa Tambour’s movement, Ali Shakoush’s faction, and the Tammuz Movement – were added to the agreement at the initiative of South Sudanese mediators and the Sudanese government. These factions, he noted, were formed under specific circumstances and had no significant military activity at the time of the agreement’s signing.

Observers and media leaks suggest growing friction among Gabriel Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement; Minni Arko Minnawi, Governor of Darfur; and Mustafa Tambour of the Sudan Liberation Movement. Meanwhile, Sudanese Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appears to be exploiting these divisions to fragment the Joint Forces. Reports indicate Minnawihas shown signs of cooperation, while Gabriel Ibrahim remains adamant about retaining control over the Ministries of Finance and Social Welfare.

Settling for Scraps

In a lengthy Facebook post, Sudanese analyst Mujahid Bushra argued that ever since the Juba Peace Agreement granted the armed movements 25% representation in the transitional government, the army identified corruption and power lust among certain movement leaders. The military, he claimed, capitalized on this to orchestrate a coup against the civilian government, which had begun publicly advocating for the dismantling of the army’s economic empire, an empire accounting for over 82% of Sudan’s economy.

Bushra added: “But the army, directed by the Islamic Movement – Sudan’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood – knew what others didn’t: that the 25% allocation was carved out of the mere 18% of resources not already under military control. The army manipulated the ignorance and greed of the movements, using them to oust the civilians via the ‘25% coup’ in October 2021.”

Today, despite the sacrifices made by the Joint Forces – men, arms, and lives – to protect the army and the kizan (a Sudanese term for the Muslim Brotherhood), the post-war reality has shifted. The military and the Brotherhood now seek even that 25%, needing all resources to finance the war and recoup losses from the collapse of their shadow economy.

According to Bushra, the Joint Forces made a strategic blunder, not only in demanding their share of power and wealth but also in threatening rebellion or opening the door to rivals, despite knowing the regime’s dependence on them. What they failed to foresee, he says, is that some within their own ranks might accept crumbs in exchange for turning against them.

He cited a recent statement from a Darfur track leader urging “political realism” – a remark interpreted by many as justification for accepting an unjust division of power. Secret meetings have reportedly taken place between members of the Sovereignty Council and certain movement leaders outside the formal Joint Forces channels, suggesting moves to isolate the current leadership.

Bushra posed a question to the Joint Forces’ leaders: “Will you continue playing puppets on the Port Sudan stage while your cause is flayed, your fighters’ sacrifices stolen, and the country’s wealth distributed behind your backs? Do you really believe the army – which betrayed peaceful protesters, the Forces of Freedom and Change, the Rapid Support Forces, and now you – would hesitate for a moment to sell you out once you’re no longer useful?”

He warned that today, the Joint Forces are nothing more than the army and Brotherhood’s last remaining “legal cover” in their confrontation with civilians and the RSF. They’re being held close, not out of loyalty, but out of fear. “Will you keep sacrificing your sons’ lives for a regime that denies you even the leftovers? Will you allow the Darfur track to be turned into fuel for a military that arms your rivals with 50,000 men to fight and replace you?”

A Grim Fate Awaits

Sudanese writer Mahmoud al-Duqm, in an op-ed for Al-Siha, painted a bleak picture for Joint Forces leaders in Port Sudan and River Nile State. After fulfilling their role – fighting the RSF in Khartoum’s triangle and the surrounding deserts, burying their dead, and licking their wounds – they are now being driven out. Public insults, accusations of betrayal and heresy, and character assassination are becoming routine in Port Sudan. Their sacrifices in this “war of regret” have earned them only ridicule and scorn.

Al-Duqm expressed astonishment that the Muslim Brotherhood in Port Sudan have not chosen Gabriel Ibrahim, the dismissed Finance Minister and head of the Justice and Equality Movement, as Prime Minister, despite his Brotherhood affiliation and deep involvement in finance and real estate. But the military’s entrenched power dynamic, rooted in decades of control since independence, has no room for leaders like Ibrahim, Minnawi, or Tambour. Their historical role, he argues, is to serve as cannon fodder—fighters and guards, not ministers or decision-makers.

He reminded readers of Minnawi’s personal losses – two brothers killed, thousands of fighters lost – yet all he has received is nothing. Even the Juba Peace Agreement’s promises have been stripped away.

Since Kamal Idris’s appointment as Prime Minister, the Joint Forces have faced a barrage of accusations – fleeing the border triangle, retreating from El-Obeid, relocating to Jebel Kordofan – all allegedly in defiance of al-Burhan, who now leans more heavily on the Abu Aqla Kikel faction.

Al-Duqm ended with a pointed message: “The people of Darfur, and Sudan at large, now see that the Joint Forces’ leaders are nothing but war profiteers with no regard for the interests of Darfur’s people. They have become a disruptive force, a burden to the nation. And the countdown has begun: war between the army and the Joint Forces is no longer a question of if, but when.”

* Bayethe Msimang is an independent writer, commentator and analyst.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

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